Denmark

Following an AML inspection on 22-23 April 2026, Finanstilsynet found that the bank had not documented independent verification of ownership and control structures for high-risk business customers, and did not obtain enough information on risk factors such as geographic exposure and source of funds. It issued two orders to correct this. The date is the report's publication date.

Following a May-June 2026 ordinary inspection (report published 1 October 2026), the bank was ordered to align its credit policy with the board's desired risk profile, improve the decision basis and risk classification of business exposures (four of 86 reviewed group exposures were downgraded), set up procedures with independent control for registering objective indications of credit impairment, set guidelines on how compliance and risk-management recommendations are used, and write down three domicile properties by just over DKK 6 million.

The report on the March 2026 inspection, which focused on high-risk online-gambling business customers and sanctions compliance, issued four orders: sufficient resources and outsourcing/alert controls, operational customer due diligence and monitoring, clear responsibilities and conflict-of-interest procedures, and proper checks on non-EU correspondent relationships including no shell-bank dealings. This is separate from the 17 August 2026 temporary stop on onboarding gambling customers already recorded.

Following an ordinary inspection in May-June 2026, Finanstilsynet ordered the savings bank to ensure its compliance function properly assesses whether its procedures and methods for complying with legislation are effective, noting the function had reviewed documents and policies without testing control effectiveness. The solvency need was left unchanged at 9.5% (31 March 2026).

After an April 2026 inspection (published 11 September 2026), Finanstilsynet issued five orders: draft a risk management policy and an own-risk and solvency assessment policy, account properly for premium provisions, stop using the loss-absorbing capacity of deferred tax unless sufficient future taxable profits are shown, and cut the head-office property valuation from DKK 63.4 million to DKK 55 million.

The May 2026 inspection led to seven orders on resourcing and succession planning, AI model risk and validation, data quality governance, IT risk management and IT third-party providers, plus a reprimand for not fixing compliance-function resourcing in time and a risk notice on earnings. The bank's solvency requirement was to rise by 0.4 percentage points because of data-quality weaknesses.

An AML inspection in January 2026 focused on Trade Finance (report dated 19 August 2026) found the quality of customer knowledge on Trade Finance customers insufficient, and ordered the branch to assess and obtain information on the purpose and intended nature of those relationships.

Finanstilsynet found that the company manages the alternative investment fund Investering og Feriebolig A/S without being authorised or registered as an AIF manager, and ordered it to bring the situation into line with the law. The page mentions no fine.

After an AML inspection in March 2026 found serious breaches, Finanstilsynet ordered the company to stop establishing new business customer relationships in online gambling until it documents that the breaches have ceased. The affected customers make up most of its portfolio. The company says it had already stopped onboarding such customers voluntarily.

Finanstilsynet ordered the bank to bring its insider lists for external issuer clients into line with MAR, after the bank reported in spring 2023 that it did not fully comply and further checks found more errors. The regulator says the scale and duration of the deficiencies may have affected market integrity; the bank has since corrected them. Published 14 August 2026.

The January 2026 AML inspection (report dated 17 June 2026) led to orders to carry out an adequate customer risk assessment, assess the purpose and intended nature of relationships, apply enhanced due diligence to higher-risk customers, and investigate and record unusual transactions and activity, including timely checks on their background and purpose.

Finanstilsynet refused the authorisation application because most management is outside Denmark, much activity is outsourced to group and third parties outside the EU without adequate local oversight, and the firm is not independent of its group, so it could not be supervised effectively. The firm must cease its activities. Published 8 May 2026.

Finanstilsynet refused the firm's application for authorisation as a crypto-asset service provider because it lacked genuine management and operations in Denmark and could not be effectively supervised, and told it to cease its activities. The firm appealed to the Business Appeals Board, which on 23 September 2026 refused suspensive effect. Published 8 May 2026.

A joint inspection with the Norwegian and Swedish authorities (February-April 2025) of Group Compliance led to two orders: a timely and comprehensive risk assessment of the MiFID rules (the existing one dated from 2020), and adequate monitoring of compliance risks in financial and non-financial risk areas. The bank's solvency need was unchanged.

A thematic inspection on 20 November 2025 (report published 24 April 2026) found that the semi-annual cost reports to the board did not analyse individual cost elements against comparable funds, and Finanstilsynet ordered the association to give the board a complete basis for assessing costs, reflected in its governance documents. The page cites no specific provision for the order itself.

The company marketed units of the fund The Many Regenergy KL to retail investors without the required authorisation. Finanstilsynet reported it to the police on 1 June 2023; the successor company, after renaming and mergers, accepted a fine notice of DKK 70,000 from NSK. The date is the page's publication date.

An inspection of sustainability disclosure and governance found missing pre-contract disclosure of sustainability-risk impact, insufficient documented methods for externally managed 'sustainable' investments and do-no-significant-harm tests, and no documented good-governance screening of investee companies. Three orders were issued.

After an ordinary inspection in November 2025 covering governance and solvency, Finanstilsynet issued four orders: assess group-wide risks including subsidiaries, calculate interest-rate risk capital by full repricing instead of a duration approximation, use a conservative collateral assumption for reinsurers, and include policyholder receivables in counterparty risk.

Finanstilsynet reprimanded an unnamed analyst who wrote and circulated a note on a stock listed on Nasdaq Copenhagen with own calculations of a theoretical share price, without disclosing that he held shares in the company. The authority treated the note as an indirect investment recommendation and the shareholding as a material conflict of interest.

The report on the 19 November 2025 inspection (published 31 March 2026) of this sole proprietorship, an agent for three foreign money-transfer providers rated high inherent risk, ordered it to apply adequate enhanced due diligence to higher-risk customers, including proof of source of funds and extra measures for transactions involving EU-listed high-risk third countries. It was also ordered to investigate unusual transaction patterns more thoroughly and to report to Hvidvasksekretariatet at once when a suspicion cannot be dispelled.

Vestre Landsret (judgment of 23 March 2026, published by Datatilsynet on 25 March) convicted the region on one of two counts of inadequate security of processing and fined it DKK 500,000, acquitting it on the other; a research and clinical database let users reach other people's files, covering about 23,000 people, by changing a URL. The first-instance court (Retten i Kolding, 23 December 2024) had fined it DKK 1 million in total on both counts.

After an AML inspection on 19 January 2026, Finanstilsynet found that the company had not assessed all relevant risks, had not documented source of funds in enough cases and had not carried out enhanced due diligence on its Iranian respondent relationships. It issued four orders and a risk notice for leaving EU Iran sanctions out of its risk assessment.

An inspection in autumn 2025 led to five orders on board conflicts of interest, the credit policy and concentration limits, documentation for large exposures, property valuation, and the risk and compliance functions. A write-down of DKK 2.7 million on three domicile properties was required and the solvency requirement was raised by 0.4 percentage points to 10.8%.

The October 2025 AML inspection (report dated 25 February 2026) rated inherent risk medium-low and ordered the company to revise its risk assessment and AML policy so they reflect its actual business, customers and products without netting off mitigants, and to put in place operational procedures for unresponsive customers and for matching-control and alert investigation.

A review of 80 commercial-property valuations (August-September 2025) led to four orders: use comparable references, reduce the value of four over-valued properties and the related loans if over-borrowed, put in independent internal controls, and set a compliance review interval shorter than five years.

The report on a December 2024 inspection (published 11 February 2026) issued twelve orders: ten on payment-services governance, accounts, dependence on the UK parent, outsourcing and safeguarding of user funds, and two on AML purpose-of-relationship information and industry risk scoring. Finanstilsynet noted major unresolved shortcomings and rated inherent money-laundering risk high; the firm still holds its licence after a 2023 revocation decision was remanded on appeal in July 2024.

The bank did not meet the requirements to obtain information on the purpose and intended nature of a number of customer relationships, and did not meet the ongoing monitoring requirements for white label clients between January 2021 and May 2023. The fine was reduced for cooperation, remedial steps and the bank's solvency. The bank adopted the fine notice on 22 January 2026; the page is dated 23 January.

Finanstilsynet ordered the bank to publish a share purchase above the EUR 20,000 threshold made by a close associate of a senior manager in the first half of 2025, which the bank had not notified to the market. The decision was published on 14 January 2026; the bank has since merged into Sydbank.

Finanstilsynet reprimanded the listed company for publishing late the share purchases made by senior executives in the first half of 2025, which exceeded the EUR 20,000 threshold then in force. The decision was published on 12 January 2026.

The June 2025 inspection of impairments, arrears and the funding and liquidity area produced six orders on liquidity add-ons for unknown arrears and open conversions, the LCR coverage framework, liquidity stress-test documentation, NSFR stress testing, separation of capital-centre funds and the liquidity buffer calculation.

Finanstilsynet ordered the company to withdraw marketing that showed an expected return above the moderate scenario in its PRIIP key information document (marketing cited returns above 20% a year against 11.70% in the KID), to publish the KID on its website, and to recalculate the risk classification and performance scenarios.

An AML inspection in May 2025 found an inadequate AML policy, insufficient compliance checks, outdated customer information, incomplete risk classification, weak enhanced due diligence and a significant backlog of alarms. Finanstilsynet issued seven orders and two reprimands, the latter for not reporting the alarm backlog on its own initiative and for loose control of access to monitoring scenarios. Report published 1 December 2025.

The June 2025 AML inspection of the Danish factoring arm of Svea Bank AB rated inherent risk medium-high and led to a series of orders covering the risk assessment, procedures, customer due diligence, monitoring, outsourcing, customer risk scoring, investigation of unusual transactions and correction of data reported to Finanstilsynet for 2021-2024. The report states no total number of orders.

The April 2025 AML inspection (report dated 14 November 2025) found a risk assessment missing national-risk-assessment risks, weak customer due diligence and updating, enhanced due diligence not carried out, flawed customer risk scoring, thin investigation of suspicious transactions and inaccurate data reported to the authority. Finanstilsynet issued orders on each of these areas and on internal controls, a reprimand for not promptly telling it of material customer-due-diligence deficiencies, and a risk notice on its current set-up; the report gives no total number of orders.

Over about two years and four months the person traded between their own accounts as both seller and buyer, in 23 trades that gave false or misleading signals about supply, demand or price. Finanstilsynet reported the person to the police on 24 June 2022 and the person paid DKK 50,000. The summary is anonymised and was published on 17 March 2025.

The bank accepted a fine notice for three matters found in an AML inspection on 30 September and 1 October 2021: customer due diligence, enhanced due diligence and the duty to investigate. Finanstilsynet had asked NSK to open a police investigation on 24 November 2022. The date is the page's date.