Taiwan

Orders for a futures trader were entered without the trader's own authorisation, and the firm did not properly apply IP-address checks to online orders. The FSC found the firm had not followed its internal control system and fined it NT$120,000.

After an inspection by the Taiwan Stock Exchange, the FSC found that a flaw in the firm's warrant market-making backup program caused many self-trades on 29 May 2026, and that its internal controls over system development and maintenance and business continuity were not properly implemented. It fined the firm NT$300,000.

After a malfunction of its domestic futures back-office system on 7 March 2026, the FSC found the firm had left database record sequence counts out of its monitoring, had no matching incident procedures and did not restore service within its own one-hour tolerance. It fined the firm NT$120,000. The page carries 15 September 2026 as the sanction date and 23 September 2026 in its metadata.

Information system incidents between 7 and 10 April 2026 exposed weak input validation, poorly designed trading-program components and inadequate testing, and the firm did not post abnormality notices on its order platforms for two of the incidents. The FSC fined it NT$240,000. The page is dated 8 September 2026; the sanction date given is 2 September 2026.

In its leveraged trading business the firm did not adequately assess operational risk when opening an account with an overseas broker, lacked risk controls over that broker's online order interface, did not control system connectivity and access rights, and did not properly report information security incidents. The FSC fined it NT$480,000.

A former director did not report interested-party information as required, so funds and discretionary accounts managed by the firm held shares of companies in which it had a conflict, producing significant losses. The firm also mismanaged interested-party data, skipped internal audits, reported major events late and submitted false or incomplete information. The FSC fined it two sums of NT$3 million (NT$6 million in total), warned it, barred certain filings and applications for periods of three months to one year, and ordered a special review of its internal controls and discipline of staff involved.

The firm used operating funds allocated to its futures proprietary trading department for futures trades made by its securities proprietary trading department to hedge spot positions, so the two operations and their accounts were not kept independent. The FSC fined it NT$120,000.

Sales representatives led people to believe that principal or returns could be guaranteed, an analyst traded stocks without prior written approval and re-traded within 30 days, and the company's review of analysts' LINE posts did not meet the industry control standard. The FSC ordered correction, fined the company NT$1.2 million and suspended three named sales representatives (surnames Hsu, Lan, Chen) for one month.

A former employee misappropriated ATM settlement funds and settlement funds owed to the Financial Information Service Co., Ltd. (FISC). The FSC found the bank had not established and effectively implemented its internal control system and fined it NT$4 million. The notice reports no other measures and gives no amounts or period for the misappropriation.

The company's review of analysts' LINE posts fell short of industry control standards, its audit department did not properly audit AML/CFT work and its AML/CFT officer lacked proof of external training. An associated person (surname Lin) also implied that principal or profit could be guaranteed and agreed to share profits with a client. The FSC ordered correction and fined the company NT$900,000. The notice cites item 9 of Art. 5 both as a paragraph and as a subparagraph.

On 26 May 2026 the Taiwan Stock Exchange suspended the firm's order entry for exceeding the centralised-market transaction limit. The FSC found it had no tiered accountability controls for intraday amounts, no top-supervisor approval threshold for the highest tier and had not reported a material contingency within two hours. It ordered correction and fined the firm NT$300,000.

The notice says the accountant did not carry out customer identity confirmation procedures as the rules require, and gives no further detail. The fine was NT$200,000. The notice gives 30 July 2026 as the date the fine was imposed; the page was updated on 5 August 2026.

A managerial officer (Yang) and an associated person (Chien) used people not employed by the firm to solicit business, and the firm's internal control system did not meet the applicable rules; direct market access forms were handled in a way that gave different traders the same dedicated line and IP range. The FSC fined the firm NT$240,000 and suspended each of the two employees from futures business for one month.

After its April 2026 merger with MasterLink Securities, Taishin Securities suffered trading system failures on 7, 14 and 20 April and 21 May 2026. The FSC found it had not effectively implemented its internal control system, issued a warning, imposed the highest fine yet on a securities firm (NT$3.6 million), added a one-fold operational risk capital charge until the cybersecurity gaps are fixed, and barred new business types, branches, related investments, capital increases and bond issues during the warning period.

The FSC fined the bank NT$32 million over deficiencies in its deposit account opening, ongoing customer due diligence and account monitoring mechanisms. The page lists the provisions breached but gives no facts on the period covered.

A former wealth manager at the bank misappropriated client funds. The FSC fined the bank NT$14 million, ordered corrective actions, and suspended acceptance of new clients for high-asset customer products and the Kaohsiung Asset Management Zone pilot for one month, to resume only after FSC approval of the fixes.

After a trading support system malfunction on 15 October 2025, the FSC found the firm did not regularly stress-test system capacity, had no validation mechanism for trade confirmation reports and did not handle erroneous trades under its error-trade procedures. It fined the firm NT$240,000.

An associated person disclosed a trader's entrusted trading matters without consent and did not properly assess the trader's creditworthiness. The firm failed in supervision: it did not assess creditworthiness properly at account opening, disclosed trading matters, and left overseas futures transactions out of its same-IP screening for online orders. The FSC fined the firm NT$240,000 and suspended the employee for one month.

A general business inspection by the Financial Examination Bureau (8 to 22 January 2026) found that the firm had not reported value at risk on underwritten shares exceeding its limit, had not set reinforced controls for material outsourced matters, and had mishandled confidential customer data requests from public agencies. The FSC found its internal control system was not duly implemented and fined it NT$300,000.

The notice records only that the firm had a personal data leak incident, and gives no detail of its scope or the reasoning. The fine was NT$50,000.

A subsidiary filed a mediation application on 29 May 2025 over an offshore wind construction contract, with an amount the notice treated as material to shareholders and share prices, but the company made its announcement and filing only on 17 June 2025, later than the two-day rule. The FSC fined the responsible person NT$240,000. The notice shows the person only as XX Guo.

A salesperson at the Zhongli Branch set up a LINE group to attract business without applying to the firm and gave customers buy and sell targets, prices and opinions. The FSC found the firm had not duly implemented its internal controls, fined it NT$600,000 and suspended the salesperson's business for two months.

A general inspection (13 November to 1 December 2025) found that the proprietary trading department did not test the reasonableness of its futures hedging requirements, risk rules lacked procedures for non-hedging trades and board approval, fees on foreign securities were not fully disclosed, no personal data inventory was done and outsourcing risk was not assessed. The FSC fined the firm NT$600,000. A separate futures-law fine on the firm of 21 August 2026 is recorded separately.

The company disposed of equity holdings continuously from September 2023 to October 2024 without following its own internal procedures for contract approval and board reporting. The FSC found this breached the public-company asset disposal rules and fined the responsible person NT$240,000. The notice shows the person only as XX Bao.

The head of the futures proprietary trading department kept opening new positions after his trading had been suspended for exceeding the annual stop-loss limit and before any reinstatement. The firm's risk office did not monitor his intraday positions in time and its trading unit did not enforce the suspension in the system. The FSC fined the firm NT$240,000 and suspended the employee from futures business for one month.

After two of five directors elected in June 2025 had resigned, vacancies reached one-third of the board, but the company did not convene a special shareholders' meeting for a by-election within 60 days (by 7 January 2026). The FSC fined the responsible person NT$240,000, not the company. The notice shows the person only as Mr. XX Lu.

The Taiwan Clearing House reported on 19 December 2025 that the company had a rejected account after a dishonoured cheque for insufficient funds, but the company filed its public announcement only on 29 January 2026, outside the two-day limit. The FSC fined the responsible person NT$240,000. The notice shows the person only as XX Hsu.

An employee of the bank's National Taiwan University branch stole funds while collecting cash off-site at National Taiwan University Hospital. The FSC held the bank in breach of its internal control duties and fined it NT$6 million. No other measures are described. This is a separate notice from the same-day Shanghai Commercial & Savings Bank case.

An employee, since dismissed, embezzled funds. The FSC found the bank's measures for managing employee misconduct deficient and fined it NT$12 million.

After a Taiwan Securities Association inspection, the FSC found the firm did not carry out reasonable due diligence on a client's professional-investor application, which relied on a single NT$30 million third-party remittance. An associated person worked before completing registration and mishandled offshore structured product sales, and their supervisor knew but did not correct it. The firm was reprimanded and fined NT$300,000, and the firm was ordered to suspend both individuals from their duties for one month each.

A general inspection (9 to 25 July 2025) found foreign-currency exposure above 15% of net worth, loose controls over trading limits for persons with limited legal capacity, account statements sent to an associated person's email, and gaps in outsourcing contracts and approvals. The FSC ordered correction and fined the firm NT$600,000.

A general business inspection found four deficiencies, including no annual credit reviews for clients with large cross-branch trading limits, acceptance of sub-brokerage buy orders from non-professional investors for leveraged inverse ETFs and foreign virtual asset ETFs, and failure to treat judicial requests for account data as confidential. The FSC concluded the internal control system was not implemented and fined the firm NT$300,000. Separate from the July 2026 Taishin Securities case already published.

A general inspection found orders placed without a limit or market price method, call-back numbers not kept, a quota breach, a loan-to-value increase approved without branch manager sign-off, subscription orders sharing contact details with employees and no dedicated personal data unit or inventory. The FSC fined the firm NT$600,000.

Exchange inspections in 2025 found that between 2019 and 2024 a then associated person had taken money from clients on the pretext of investment or stock subscription, with no trades actually executed. The FSC fined the firm NT$900,000 and ordered it to dismiss the person. The notice shows the individual only as XX Chang.

A general inspection (23 June to 9 July 2025) found an associated person had set trading targets, prices and quantities for clients, and weaknesses in brokerage, foreign securities order handling, professional-investor checks and joint marketing among financial holding subsidiaries. The FSC fined the firm NT$900,000 and suspended the individual for six months. A separate futures-law action on the firm of 13 March 2026 is recorded separately.

An inspection of operations outsourcing (17 to 23 July 2025) found the firm had not done the required outsourcing assessments, had not set enhanced controls or contingency measures for material outsourced matters, had not tested its contingency plans, and had filed incomplete outsourcing items with the Taiwan Stock Exchange. The FSC fined it NT$300,000.

A general inspection (2 to 18 June 2025) found, among other things, trading limits approved outside approval levels, orders accepted from non-professional investors for products they were not allowed to buy, unencrypted board materials and directors' conflicts of interest discussed without prior audit committee review. The FSC fined the firm NT$300,000 and the person responsible NT$240,000; the amount shown is the sum of the two. A separate Hua Nan Securities action of 5 January 2026 is recorded separately.

An inspection (5 to 22 May 2025) found the firm kept accepting orders from non-professional investors for an inverse ETF after its leverage rose to two times, and did not complete the outsourcing materiality assessment, risk assessment and due diligence on time or have the risk assessment approved by the responsible supervisor. The FSC fined it NT$300,000.

An employee traded futures through another person's account and placed trades on mobile internet during trading hours against the firm's internal rules, and the firm did not supervise or enforce its controls. The FSC fined the firm NT$240,000 and suspended the employee for two months. A separate KGI Futures action of 22 July 2026 is recorded separately.

Two employees solicited business through people not employed by the firm, and one of them, without authority, had IT assign specific direct market access lines and IP ranges to certain clients; the firm's internal controls also fell short. The FSC fined the firm NT$240,000 and suspended the two employees for one and two months.

In 2024 the company bought equity-method investments on the exchange without prior board approval, and the board resolved to buy shares from its then chairperson without first obtaining audit committee approval; he did not disclose his interest or recuse himself and the minutes were inaccurate. The FSC fined the person responsible NT$960,000. The notice shows the person only as XX Wu.

The FSC found the bank lacked adequate mechanisms for updating credit card customer information, reissuing lost cards, adjusting credit card payment amounts and managing its card image retrieval system, and fined it NT$12 million.

A former fund manager, named in the notice only as XX Li, leaked information learned through his role and traded the same stocks as his fund through another person's account without reporting it. The FSC found the company's internal controls ineffective, fined it NT$1.2 million, restricted new foreign-fund filings for 12 months and other applications for six and three months, and ordered his removal from his position.

A former discretionary investment manager, named in the notice only as XX Chiu, obtained trading information through his position and used another person's account to trade the same stocks during a discretionary account's trading period without reporting it. The FSC found the company's internal controls ineffective, fined it NT$1.2 million, restricted new foreign-fund filings for 12 months and other applications for six and three months, and ordered the manager's removal from his position.